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TRUST THE PEOPLE OR BUSINESS AS USUAL?  
AN EXAMINATION OF LAY PARTICIPATION IN THE JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
KENNY YANG* 
ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the two pillars of lay participation in the Japanese criminal justice system 
– the Prosecution Review Commission (Kensatsu Shinsakai) and the Lay Assessor’s System 
(Saiban-in). The author analyses these to examine whether these have indeed resulted in true 
lay participation in the criminal justice system. The article concludes that due to the structural 
limitations of the Prosecution Review Commission (Kensatsu Shinsakai) and the Lay 
Assessor’s System (Saiban-in), true lay participation in the criminal justice system is somewhat 
limited.  
I  INTRODUCTION 
There are two crucial points in time in the life cycle of the criminal justice system. The first is 
at the point of indictment, where charges are brought against the accused. The second is at the 
point of conviction, where a court makes a determination of guilt or innocence on the crime 
that the accused is alleged to have committed. Given the importance of these two crucial points 
in the criminal justice system, what safeguards are in place to ensure sufficient accountability, 
fairness and scrutiny? 
In Japan, the Prosecution Review Commission (Kensatsu Shinsakai) and the Lay Assessor’s 
System (Saiban-in) have been introduced as twin pillars of public participation and oversight 
in these two crucial points of the criminal justice system. At first blush, it would appear that 
the Japanese have placed their faith in the hands of the public, heralding an age of democratic 
engagement in civil society. However, as this article will show, legal education and training in 
Japan is an elite realm, offered only to a select few. As such, drawing arguments from the elite 
management school of thought, the two systems of lay participation may merely give the 
appearance of democratic participation but maintain the reality of the status quo.   
For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘JPL Professional’ refers to a judge, prosecutor or a 
lawyer (bengoshi) who has passed the Japanese National Bar Examinations, completed the 
apprenticeship period by the Legal Training & Research Institute and has embarked on a career 
as a judge, prosecutor or bengoshi-lawyer. In the judicial sphere, the term ‘career judge’ refers 
to a judge who is appointed as a career judge, whether or not legally trained,1 and the term ‘lay 
judge’ refers to a non-legally trained citizen judge appointed under the lay assessor (saiban-in) 
system.   
                                                          
*  LLB (First Class), LLM (Distinction), Barrister & Solicitor (Supreme Court of Western Australia). The author 
is grateful to Professor Kent Anderson (University of Western Australia), for his guidance in this article. The 
views expressed (and any errors) in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the position of any institution 
the author is affiliated with. 
1 Noting that Summary Court Judges and Supreme Court Justices need not complete the National Bar 
Examinations and training stint at the Legal Research & Training Institute.  
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II THE TWIN SYSTEM OF LAY PARTICIPATION 
A  The Lay Assessor’s System (Saiban-in) 
On 4 Aug 2009, the murder trial of Katsoyoshi Fujii commenced in the Tokyo District 
Courthouse.2 Katsoyoshi Fujii, a seventy-two-year-old male, was accused of fatally stabbing 
his elderly neighbour.3 The trial commenced with great fanfare and attracted much of the 
media’s attention – as murder trials do – but also because this trial saw Japan’s first Lay 
Assessor’s System (Saiban-in) (‘LAS’) in action.4 Comprising 3 career judges and 6 lay judges, 
it heralded a brave new world of citizen engagement in the criminal justice system in Japan.  
Starting in the 1980s, the Japanese criminal legal landscape underwent a series of reviews.5 
Stemming from a series of wrongful convictions, limited checks-and-balances and 
bureaucracy, the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations advocated for an all-citizen jury 
system to overhaul the judicial system.6 The term ‘saiban-in’, literally translating as lay judges, 
was first raised by Professor Masahito Inouye in 2001.7 Inouye recommended the saiban-in 
seido, or Lay Assessor System and a committee was formed to implement the 
recommendations.8 In 2004, the final recommendations of the LAS were sent to the Cabinet 
Office. The proposal was sent to the Diet (the Japanese Parliament) that same year and the Act 
was passed, with LAS trials to commence in 2009. 
Under the LAS, it is this mixed panel of 9 (3 career judges and 6 lay judges) who shall 
determine the guilt of an accused person. Where the defence is not objecting to the 
prosecution’s case, a reduced panel comprising 1 career judge and 4 lay judges may sit with 
the consent of both parties. The 3 career judges are drawn from the ranks of the Japanese 
professional judiciary and are full time career judges. The 6 lay judges however, are drawn by 
lots from the ranks of citizens who have voting rights in the Diet.9 Some categories of persons 
are excluded from service. These include persons who have not completed compulsory 
education under the Schools Education Act, persons who have been subject to imprisonment, 
persons with physical or mental incapacities, for whom the LAS duties would be a significant 
burden, Ministers, Members of the Diet as well as certain categories of public servants.10 It 
should be noted that JPL professionals, quasi-legal professionals and persons qualified to be a 
                                                          
2 Zachary Corey and Valerie Hans, ‘Japan’s New Lay Judge System: Deliberative Democracy in Action?’ 
(2010) 12 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 73. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Makoto Ibusuku, ‘Quo Vadis? First Year Inspection of Japanese Mixed-Jury Trials’ (2010) 12 Asian-Pacific 
Law and Policy Journal 25, 25. 
5 See Hiroshi Fukurai, ‘People’s Panels vs Imperial Hegemony: Japan’s Twin Lay Justice Systems and the 
Future of American Military Bases in Japan’ (2010) 12 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 95 for further 
details.  
6 Fukurai, above n 5, 104  
7 Ibid, 108. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Kent Anderson and David Johnson, ‘Japan’s new criminal trials: Origins, operations and implications’ in Andrew 
Harding & Penelope Nicholson (eds) New Courts in Asia (Routledge, 2011) 371, 380. See Art 13 of the Lay 
Assessor’s Act (‘LAS Act) as translated in Kent Anderson and Emma Saint, ‘Japan’s Quasi-Jury (saiban-in) Law: 
An Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials’ (2005) 6 
Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 233.  
10 Art 14 & 15 LAS Act. 
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JPL professional are also excluded.11 Those who have previously served as a lay assessor or 
on the Prosecution Review Commission may also decline service. There is also discretion for 
Lay Assessors to be dismissed under Articles 41-44 of the LAS Act.12  
The entire panel deliberates together and while only the career judges are authorized to interpret 
the law and make decisions on procedure, the lay judges are permitted to be heard on such 
matters.13 The lay judges may also directly question witnesses, victims and defendants.14 
Decisions are made by majority vote, although there must be at least one career judge and one 
lay judge in the majority view.15  
B  The Prosecution Review Commission (Kensatsu Shinsakai) 
In Australia and most commonwealth jurisdictions, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
dominated and jealously guarded by the state.16 There is little recourse for the aggrieved victim 
to challenge a prosecutor’s decision not to charge a potential offender. Such was also the case 
in Japan until the inception of the Prosecution Review Commission (‘PRC’). The PRC has been 
likened to an American-style grand jury system.17 This is unsurprising given the influence of 
US military forces which gave rise to the PRC’s inception in Japan. Conceived by General 
Douglas McArthur of the Allied Forces in Japan post-World War II, the PRC incepted in 1984 
was seen as a democratic institution for engaging the people.18  
The PRC’s principal purpose is to empanel a group of 11 randomly selected Japanese citizens 
to review the Japanese prosecutor’s decision not to charge potential violators of the law.19 
Similar to the LAS, those who perform vital political and criminal justice functions are 
excluded from serving.20 Unlike the LAS however, the PRC serves for a term of 6 months, 
with ¼ of members being replaced every three months.21 
The process is initiated when a complaint has been filed against a prosecutor’s decision not to 
charge a potential offender.22 The PRC has the power to question prosecutors, request 
additional information, summon witnesses and consult an expert in coming to their 
determination.23  
                                                          
11 Art 15 LAS Act. 
12 Art 41-44 LAS Act. 
13 Art 66 LAS Act. 
14 Art 56, 58, 59 LAS Act. 
15 Art 67 LAS Act. 
16 The Director of Public Prosecutions (of each State and Territory) is usually charged with the day to day conduct 
of prosecutions with the Attorney-General retaining residual power as the ‘First Law Officer’.  
17 Hiroshi Fukurai, ‘Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Lay Oversight of the Government’s Discretion 
of Prosecution’ (2011) 6 University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review 1, 5. 
18 Fukurai above n 5, 102. 
19 Hiroshi Fukurai, ‘Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury System’ (2011) 86 Chicago-Kent Law Review 790, 790, 
801 
20 Hiroshi Fukurai, ‘Japan’s Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Lay Oversight of the Government’s Discretion 
of Prosecution’ (2011) 6 University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review 2, 14.  
21 Ibid 13. 
22 Fukurai, above n 17, footnote 138 citing Art 30 PRC Law Act.  
23 Ibid footnote 137 citing Art 38 PRC Law Act. ,  
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After its review, the PRC makes one of the following 3 recommendations:24 
(1) Non-indictment is proper 
(2) Non-indictment is improper 
(3) Indictment is proper 
A simply majority is required for (1) and (2) while a supermajority of 8 out of the 11 votes is 
required to pass (3).25 Prior to the 2004 amendments, these recommendations were merely 
advisory and thus not binding on the prosecutor. The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations 
have long recommended that the PRC’s recommendations be made binding on the prosecutor 
and that the prosecutor be made to explain reasons for deviating from the PRC’s 
recommendations. There was some debate regarding the effectiveness, or lack thereof of the 
PRC if the prosecutor can simply ignore its recommendations. The 2004 revisions therefore 
saw amendments to the PRC Act. As a result, the position is now as follows:26 when a 
prosecutor make a decision not to indict in a case and if the PRC decides that indictment is 
proper, the prosecutor is obliged to re-consider the non-indictment decision, taking into 
consideration the PRC’s opinion. If, upon reconsideration, the prosecutor still takes the view 
that non-indictment is proper, the prosecutor will be asked to explain the basis of this decision 
to the PRC. The PRC will then review the matter for a second time and can accept the 
prosecutor’s reasoning or issue a second recommendation to indict, which is then binding on 
the prosecutor.  
The Asashi Stampede Incident and the Fukuchisen Derailment Incident are two examples of 
the PRC importance. In the Asashi Stampede Incident, a Deputy Chief Officer was alleged to 
be professionally negligent and thus responsible for the injuries of 247 persons and the death 
of 11 people, after a bridge collapsed during a stampede. It was discovered that the police were 
forewarned of the risk but failed to take precautionary measures. However, no prosecution was 
initiated. Indeed, prosecutors had twice refused to indict despite an advisory recommendation 
to do so (before the PRC Act stipulating binding recommendations came into force). The 
victims’ families and public were outraged and It was only in 2009, when the new PRC Act 
came into force that the prosecution was obliged to initiate prosecution.   
In the Fukuchisen Derailment Incident in 2005, a JR West train derailed and injured 555 people 
while killing 107 individuals. It was reported that a major factor in the accident was JR’s 
management policies placed profits and not safety as its top priority.27 JR’s then-President was 
indicted, though the prosecution stopped short of indicting 8 former JR West executives in 
charge of safety measures. The victims submitted a complaint to the PRC. Three former JR 
West executives were eventually also indicted as a result of the PRC’s recommendations.  
                                                          
24 There is of course some debate as to the difference between ‘indictment is proper’ and ‘non-indictment is 
improper’ – the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations has essentially taken the view that these are of the 
same legal status 
25 Ibid 8. 
26 For details on the 2004 amendments, see Fukurak, above n 17, 9-12. 
27 Fukurai, above n 17, 18. 
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There is thus great potential for the PRC to increase civic participation and the rule of law in 
Japan. The PRC can help expose the fortified terrain of special protection and immunity given 
by the Japanese government to influential political heavyweights, high-ranking bureaucrats, 
and business elites.28  
III THE LEGAL EDUCATION LANDSCAPE OF JAPAN 
While the two systems illustrated above attempt to be inclusive in allowing lay participants in 
the legal sphere, the legal education and training landscape of Japan is an elite, highly exclusive 
club requiring a lengthy education system capped by an extremely competitive national 
examination.  
To be a JPL professional under the pre-2004 system, one had to pass the National Legal 
Examination, which was open even to those without a college education.29 Under this system, 
about 1-3% of candidates passed the Bar examinations.30 In April 2004, the new graduate Law 
School system emerged and to be a JPL professional under this new system, one must first 
complete a first degree,31 embark on a 2-3 year graduate Law School (hōka daigaku-in) degree, 
pass the National Bar Examinations. The pass rate for the current National Bar Examinations 
ranges at about 20-25%.32 There is also a 3-strike rule and a candidate must pass the Bar exams 
in 3 attempts or less within 5 years of graduation.33 JPL candidates then undergo 1 year 
apprenticeship at the Legal Training & Research Institute in attachments with the courts, 
prosecutor’s office and private practice. At the conclusion of the attachment stint, there is 
another exam and virtually all will pass.34 JPL candidates then move to one of the 3 tracks – 
Prosecutor, Judge or Lawyer-Bengoshi.35  
While the current 20-25% pass rate can be argued to be high when compared to the pre-2004 
1-3% pass rate, it should be noted that in the United States, it is typical for 60% of candidates 
to pass the Bar examinations.36 Even the New York Bar Examinations, often seen as a national 
and international benchmark of quality, had a pass rate of 73% in 2014.37  
                                                          
28 Fukurai, above n 17, 4. 
29 Masaki Abe and Luke Nottage, ‘Japanese Law: An Overview’ in Jan Smits (ed), Encyclopaedia of Comparative 
Law (Elgar, 2012) 472. 
30 Kent Anderson and Trevor Ryan, ‘Gatekeepers: A Comparative Critique of Admission to the Legal Profession 
and Japan’s new Law Schools’ in Stacey, Keele, Tarlor (eds) Legal Education in Asia: Globalisation, Change 
and Context (2010) 52; Takahiro Saito, ‘The Tragedy of Japanese Legal Education: Japanese “American” Law 
Schools’ (2006-2007) 24(1) Wisconsin International Law Journal 197, 199, Footnote 9. 
31 Up to 25% of students opt for an undergraduate degree with a major in law at the hogakubu faculties. A student 
from a hogakubu undergraduate law school only has to complete 2 years at the graduate Law School. See Carl 
Goodman, Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis (2012) 203. 




33 Colin Jones, ‘Japan’s New Law Schools: The Story So Far’ (2008) 14(27) Journal of Japanese Law 248, 249. 
34 Goodman, above n 31, 199. 
35 Abe and Nottage, above n 29, 472. 
36 Goodman, above n 31, 199. 




Essentially to be a JPL professional in Japan today, one would have 3-4 years of an 
undergraduate degree, followed by 2-3 years of a graduate Law School degree, the National 
Bar Examinations, and followed by the 1 year Legal Training and Research Institute (shiho 
kenshujo) apprenticeship. An JPL professional would thus have approximately 7-8 years of 
legal education and training and would arguably have been in the top 20% of his/her cohort, 
having passed ‘one of the most exacting and difficult tests’.38 Judges and prosecutors in 
particular, remain very much an ‘exclusive class of bureaucrats’.39 
IV  THE NEED FOR PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND PARTICIPATION 
As articulated, that the Japanese JPL professional is among the best educated, having overcome 
many hurdles to the profession. With such a professional, one would imagine that any society 
would be satisfied in leaving the substantive decision making of indictment and conviction – 
to such a professional.  
A  Judges and Prosecutors in Ivory Towers (or Government Housing) 
Ironically, the elite nature of the JPL professional could be one argument against them 
exercising unfettered and unsupervised discretion in the criminal justice system. As explained 
earlier, the JPL professional route is such that upon completion of the 1 year training stint with 
the Legal Training and Institute, the JPL professional embarks on 1 of 3 tracks – Judge, 
Prosecutor or Lawyer-Bengoshi.  
Unlike the traditional common law system, these routes are generally linear and there is little 
permeability between these tracks. In order to become a Judge or Prosecutor, one must be 
selected by the government. 7% of the JPL candidates are appointed as Judges and 3% as 
Prosecutors.40 The remaining 90% go on to private practice.41  Generally, grades at the National 
Bar Examinations feature prominently in determining these tracks and only JPL candidates 
with the better grades of the cohort are selected as Judges and Prosecutors. As West notes, 
Prosecutors are considered elite bureaucrats in Japan and only students with high grades make 
the cut.42 Prosecutors are also generally prosecutors for life.43  
Likewise, grades and personality in the Bar Examinations matter significantly in judicial 
selection.44 As West puts it, while lawyers elsewhere might become judges later in life through 
demonstrated work experience, the Japanese judicial selection is so early on in their legal life 
that grades are likely the foremost criteria.45 After appointment to the bench, West illustrates 
the life of a Japanese judge through the fictional Judge Tanaka.46 Tanaka achieves excellent 
                                                          
38 Goodman, above n 31, 196. 
39 Fukurai, above n 5, 105. 
40 Abe and Nottage, above n 29, 473. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Mark West, Secrets, Sex and Spectacle: The Rules of Scandal in Japan and the United States (University of 
Chicago, 2008) 35. 
43 Ibid 38. 
44 Mark West, Lovesick Japan: Sex, Marriage, Romance, Law (Cornell University, 2011) 16. 
45 Ibid 16. 
46 Ibid 14. 
7 
 
grades in High School and then attends one of Japan’s elite universities.47 He later passes the 
Bar exams, completes his training at the Legal Training and Research Institute and is appointed 
as an Assistant Judge. He is promoted to a full judge in 10 years.48 As an elite bureaucrat, he 
will likely marry someone of the appropriate social standing – like the daughter of a judge-
instructor of the Legal Training and Research Institute.49 Tanaka resides in government 
provided judicial housing, where 60% of fellow judges live.50 He develops relationships with 
other judges and his wife gets to know the wives of other judges.51 After a number of transfers 
to courts throughout Japan and a relatively illustrious career, he retires at age 65.52 
It can be argued then that Japanese judges and prosecutors are very similar to Judge Tanaka – 
they are homogenous lot, having been cut from similar cloth, attending the same schools,53 
undergoing the same experience and training, perhaps even living in the same buildings and 
interacting with the same people and are out of touch with the ordinary person. They may also 
be pro-state.54 Some commentators opine that lay participation may be a way to temper this.55  
Accordingly, it may be necessary to insert into the system an element of lay oversight, through 
a regime to ensure that the important discretion exercised by the prosecutor and judge are not 
made in a vacuum, from ivory towers (or government housing). 
B  Scrutinizing Japan’s Crime Control Model 
Japan is one of the few developed countries to retain the death penalty. With a conviction rate 
of more than 99%,56 a confession rate of 92%57 and a pre-indictment detention period of up to 
23 days,58 Japan may be said to be a country of the ‘Crime Control model’ espoused by 
Professor Herbert Packer.59 Some argue that the high conviction and confession rate is nothing 
                                                          
47 Under the pre-2004 system.  
48 Abe and Nottage, above n 29, 474. 
49 West, above n 44, 19 
50 Ibid 19. 
51 Ibid 20. 
52 Ibid 21. 
53 Ramseyer notes that the courts seem to favour University of Tokyo graduates – J Ramseyer, ‘Do School Cliques 
Dominate Japanese Bureaucracies?: Evidence from Supreme Court Appointments’ (2011) 88 Washington 
University Law Review 1681; Another study notes that 73% of department chiefs or higher in the civil service 
were University of Tokyo graduates – see Tom Ginsburg, ‘Transforming Legal Education in Japan and Korea’ 
(2004) 22 Pennsylvania State International Law Review 433. 
54 Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in 
Japan (2003), as cited in Anderson and Johnson above n 9, 375. It has been argued for example, that the Supreme 
Court Secretariat maintains control over judicial postings and promotions and this has hampered judicial 
independence.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Arne Soldwedel, ‘Testing Japan’s Convictions: the Lay Judge System and the Rights of Criminal Defendants 
‘(2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1417, 1446; David Johnson, ‘The Japanese Way of Justice : 
Prosecuting Crime in Japan (2002) 215. 
57 Daijiro Yasuda, ‘One Aspect of Criminal Justice in Japan: Confessions’ (Paper presented at the Australia 
Network for Japanese Law Conference, Sydney, 23 Feb 2005). 
58 See Art 60 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Kazuko Ito, ‘Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal 
Justice Reform in Japan’ (2013) 80 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1245, 1249; United Nations Asia and 
Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Criminal Justice in Japan, 17 
available at  <www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDFcrimjust/chapter1.pdf>. 
59 Herbert Packer, ‘Two Models of Criminal Process’ (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1. 
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more efficient policing and prosecution,60 and a genuinely remorseful accused.61 The sceptics, 
however, allege that there must be something more sinister at play.  
Critics point to the 23 day period as too long and indeed,62 during that time, access to counsel 
may be limited. One lawyer stated that in the 16 days his client was detained, he met his client 
7 times for 20-30 minutes each time, totalling 3 hours 15 minutes.63 The prosecution on the 
other hand, interrogated his client for 161 hours and 17 minutes.64 The argument is that 23 days 
is plenty of time for an accused to be pressured, coerced, deceived, intimidated, and threatened 
such that any confession is likely involuntary or worse, false.65 Amnesty International has 
highlighted the case of Sugaya Toshikazu, who ‘confessed’ to murders and spent 17 years in 
prison.66 DNA evidence later exculpated him.67 
Sugaya was ‘fortunate’ in that he was not given the death penalty. After 17 years thus, he was 
finally acquitted and released in 2010.68 Those sentenced to death may not have that chance. 
The high conviction rate coupled with the death penalty has critics concerned about the 
possibility of a wrong conviction. As expressed by the United Nations Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Navi Pillay, in 2010:69 
As a judge on the UN Rwanda Tribunal, I sentenced a number of people who had been found 
guilty of genocide to life imprisonment, and I firmly believe this is a suitably severe 
punishment, but – importantly – it is also one that can be rectified or compensated, if it turns 
out the person in question was wrongly convicted. I would warmly welcome steps towards the 
abolition of the death penalty in Japan… 
Amnesty International has also deplored Japan’s death penalty regime.70 It highlights that the 
process is shrouded in secrecy and indeed, those on death row are not informed of the time of 
their execution until hours before the event.71 Families are only informed after the fact.72 
As can be seen, the homogenous nature of the judge and prosecutor, coupled with the ‘crime 
control mode’ of a high conviction rate, a high confession rate, a lengthy pre-indictment 
                                                          
60 Johnson, above n 56, 215. 
61 Yasuda, above n 57. 
62 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2014/2015 (2015) at 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/japan/report-japan/>. 
63 Ouno Masao & Yasuo Watanabe, Shine and Shadow of Criminal Justice (1989) as cited in Kazuko Ito, 
‘Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal Justice Reform in Japan’ (2013) 80 University of Cincinnati Law 
Review 1245, 1249. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Kazuko Ito, Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal Justice Reform in Japan (2013) 80 University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 1245, 1250-1251. 
66 Amnesty International, Japan: Briefing to the UN Committee Against Torture (2013) 6. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 United Nations Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Leader wanted: Japan's agenda on Human 
Rights’(12 May 2010) at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10040&LangID=E>. 





detention period and the death penalty can be ammunition for critics to use in justifying that 
public oversight in the Japanese criminal justice system is necessary.  
V  TRUST THE PEOPLE?  
A  Motivations for Maintaining the Status Quo 
On the other hand, there are also strong motivations for maintaining the status quo. Japanese 
society can be said to be hierarchical, with a high level of trust placed in authority figures.73 
This article has already outlined the rigorous process one must go through to be a JPL 
professional. In Japan, judges and prosecutors are seen as elite bureaucrats74 and lawyer-
bengoshis are conferred the honorific ‘sensei’.75 In light of the high training, prestige and trust 
in the JPL professional, it seems odd for such a society to then entrust similar responsibilities 
to any person off the street.  
Indeed, in neighbouring Asian countries, the historical trend has been to move away from lay 
participation. Malaysia has abolished jury trials in 1995.76 Brunei has also done so in 1988.77 
In Singapore, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, a lawyer himself by training abolished 
the jury system in Singapore.78 In his first case as defence lawyer, Lee had secured the acquittal 
of four men, employing ‘the simple tricks of advocacy’.79 Upon acquittal by the jury, Lee noted 
that the judge looked disgusted.80 Lee himself ‘felt sick’81 though he had discharged his duty. 
The acquittal led to him having ‘grave doubts about the practical value of the jury system’.82 
While these comments are made in the context of lay participation at the conviction stage, they 
are arguably applicable also to lay participation in the indictment process. The argument is that 
lay participants, are ill equipped to deal with these crucial decision making affecting life and 
liberty. Such tasks are best left to the professionals, with the necessary education, training and 
temperament.   
Notably, the current players in the system stand to lose the most in a truly ‘democratic’ criminal 
justice system. With lay participation, prosecutors would have to deal with unpredictable 
adjudication by lay judges.83 They would also lose prosecutorial discretion in the indictment 
process. Similarly, career judges who have long had the final say in the Japanese trials would 
have now have to share their bench with lay judges.84 There is a strong disincentive for the 
                                                          
73 Anderson and Johnson above n 9, 383. 
74 West, above n 42.  
75 Goodman, above n 31, 196. 
76 Neil Vidmar, World Jury Systems (Oxford University, 2000) 447, as cited in Anderson and Johnson above n 9, 
383. 
77 Anderson and Johnson above n 9, 383.  
78 Lee Kuan Yew, Third World to First: The Singapore Story (HarperCollins, 2000) Vol II. 
79 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Times, 1998) 144. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Lee, above n 78. 
83 Johnson, above n 56, 377.  
84 Ibid.  
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judge and prosecutor, with some of the brightest minds in society, who have worked so long 
and so hard to get to their positions, to now share their role with lay participants.  
B  True Lay Participation? 
The players in the criminal justice system must thus balance maintaining the status quo and the 
pressure for public accountability and participation. One possible route is to maintain the status 
quo and do so loudly and unapologetically. However, this route may lead to increased external 
scrutiny and international criticism. Commentators have noted that efforts to create 
participatory institutions including their own equitable judicial systems, might be one way to 
resist the influence and criticisms.85 Another possible route thus, might be to engage in 
wholesale and genuine reform. However, this comes with the risk of the loss of control. One 
other route is to allow some semblance of public participation in the system but maintaining 
overall control such that any true change to the status quo is minimal, or none at all.  
At first blush, the LAS and PRC might appear to herald a brave new world of public 
participation. However, upon closer examination, it would appear that the structural limitations 
and lack of knowledge on part of the lay participant effectively results in the judge and 
prosecutor effectively maintaining control of proceedings.  
1  Structural Limitations 
The first limitation of the Lay Assessor’s System is its limited jurisdiction. It covers cases:86 
(1) involving crimes punishable by death or by imprisonment for an indefinite period or by 
imprisonment with hard labour; 
(2) involving crimes in which the victim has died due to an intentional criminal act 
 
Notably, the system extends to offences with the death penalty. With this, Japan is then able to 
now, to some extent at least, deflect criticisms on the fear of irreversible wrongful convictions. 
However, these offences are likely to constitute only a fraction of the criminal case load and in 
reality, the bulk of matters will be disposed of without lay judges.  
The PRC’s limitation is that it only addresses a claim that a prosecution was improperly 
dropped.87  In this regard, it provides the aggrieved victim with legal recourse through the PRC, 
who may then compel the prosecution to commence criminal proceedings. It does not provide 
recourse to an accused person who feels prosecution has been wrongly commenced against 
him/her.88 An aggrieved accused’s only avenue of redress is through the courts. The PRC also 
appears to have no jurisdiction over the investigation and interrogation process,89 of which 
much of the criticisms are targeted. 
                                                          
85 Hiroshi Fukurai, Kay-Wah Chan, Setsuo Miyazawa, ‘The Resurgence of Lay Adjudicatory Systems in East 
Asia’ (2010) 12 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 1. 7.  
86 See Art 2 of the LAS Act, as translated in Anderson and Saint, above n 3.  
87 Marcia Goodman, ‘The Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan’ (1986) 5 University of 
California Pacific Basin Law Journal 16, 55. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Japanese prosecutors are actively involved in investigation and interrogation.  
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The PRC also does not appear to be able to give directions as to the appropriate charge that 
should be preferred. The prosecution can thus easily bypass the jurisdiction of the LAS by 
exercising their prosecutorial discretion charging a crime outside of the LAS Act’s mandate.90 
Similarly, prosecutors may also simply appeal the acquittal if necessary. By allowing ‘two bites 
of the cherry’, an appeal may create the possibility of career judges overruling a lay assessor 
panel’s decision based on the lack of expertise.91 There is currently no appellate Lay Assessor’s 
System and no appellate PRC review. As such, there is no lay oversight of the decision to 
appeal and the appeal itself.   
2  ‘Guiding’ the Lay Participant 
The expertise of the PRC in determining a case can also be questioned. During the review, the 
PRC it has the powers to call on witnesses, question prosecutors and seek expert advice.92 
However, as the lay participants are not legally trained, they may rely on the prosecution for 
‘guidance’.93 The PRC regime also allows for a lawyer to act as legal advisor to the PRC.94 
This legal advisor’s assists to help the PRC in determinations on law and legal processes. As 
illustrated above, in the scenario where the PRC has issued a first recommendation to indict, 
against the prosecutor’s initial decision not to do so, the prosecutor is summoned before the 
PRC to explain the basis for the decision not to indict. Here, the prosecutor may rely on legal 
arguments (such as the insufficiency of evidence to make out a charge) to defend the initial 
decision. The PRC’s legal advisor is crucial at this juncture to properly advise the PRC.  It is 
unclear what measures are in place to ensure the legal advisor’s independence and frankness 
in advising the PRC. It is also questionable, given the knowledge imbalance between the PRC, 
the legal advisor and prosecutor,95 how much deference is given to their opinions in the 
process.96 As such, one may question the true nature of the lay participant’s engagement in the 
PRC.  
In the common law world, the lay judge plays a different and distinct role from the career judge. 
The lay judge sits on the lay jury, with the career judge presiding over proceedings.97 It is 
usually the lay jury thus that makes the final determination on fact. The Supreme Court and the 
Ministry for Justice (the organisation that oversees the prosecution in Japan) were against the 
                                                          
90 Douglas Levin, ‘Saiban-in-seido: Lost in Translation? How the Source of Power Underlying Japan’s Proposed 
Lay Assessor System May Determine Its Fate’ (2008) 10 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal  199, 211.  
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idea of a US styled jury, preferring for career judges and prosecutors to maintain control.98 The 
saiban-in system can thus be said to be a compromise of sorts. Lay citizen judges thus sit with 
career judges – the lay and learned collectively make a determination on the case. Not only is 
it therefore possible that the lay judges seek the expertise of the career judges in their 
deliberations but the Act specifically empowers the chief judge (of the panel), who is inevitably 
a career judge, to explain the necessary laws to the lay judges and to provide opportunity for 
them to voice their views.99  
However, the extent of the opportunity to provide genuine views is questionable.100 The lay 
judge may well defer to the career judge, perhaps not because of deference, but because of the 
lack of legal knowledge and experience.101 Unlike the German lay jury,102 which is appointed 
for a number of years, the Japanese lay judge is appointed as a one-off. This does not give any 
lay judge experience to accumulate knowledge or experience as a judge.103 Inevitably, the lay 
judges must rely on the experience and knowledge of the career judges. The is thus the potential 
for the career judges to influence judges, which have caused some concern.104 In the common 
law world, while the career judge may give instructions or directions to the lay jury, this is 
made in open court, before the accused person and counsels and open to scrutiny (and indeed 
often forms the grounds of an appeal). Indeed, research in other lay tribunals have shown that 
lay judges rarely vote against career judges – the majority of mixed tribunal verdicts are 
unanimous.105 
Public opinion polls have also shown that the majority of the Japanese community have 
indicated a reluctance to serving on the jury, citing reasons such as their inadequacy in making 
decisions on legal matters and being too busy to serve.106 This lassez-faire attitude has also 
been documented in other research in lay tribunals elsewhere. A study in Poland found that 
only one in eleven lay judges had read the case file.107 In another study in Croatia, research 
showed that the lay judges only asked questions infrequently and were not active during trials 
and deliberations – even when they were, their contributions were noted as not particularly 
significant.108 This combination of a reluctance to serve and a lack of knowledge combine to 
potentially allow for the career judges to dominate proceedings. However, it is difficult to 
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examine the extent of career judge’s opinions on the lay jury in the Japanese model, as strict 
secrecy laws have ensured saiban-in deliberations remain confidential and isolated from any 
real public scrutiny.109  
The career judge thus has an advantage and has the potential to ‘persuade lay judges and gently 
guide them towards making the preferred decision’.110 If ‘guiding’ the lay judges towards 
making the right decision still does not achieve the required result, the saibain-in system 
effectively give the career judges a potential veto in the case. Unlike the common law jury, 
where unanimity (or at least near unanimity) is generally required,111 Japanese verdicts only 
require a majority, with at least one career judge.112 The career judges thus have a veto and 
indeed, if united, only require (and convince) 2 of the 6 lay judges to join their views for verdict 
to be rendered. As the Russians say, the lay judges are nothing more than ‘body guards for the 
professional judge’.113  
3  Secrecy & the Unknown 
Japan maintains strict secrecy laws for lay judges of saiban-in. They are not permitted to reveal 
deliberations of the saiban-in.114 Contravention can result in a fine of up to Y500,000 and/or 
imprisonment of up to 6 months.115 In contrast to this, US jurors are free to write ‘tell all’ books 
for commercial publication and profits and can disclose the communications and voting 
preferences of the other jurors in the case.116 Australia adopts a middle ground and allows 
disclosure but not for remuneration.117 While secrecy during proceedings is understandable, 
continued secrecy post-proceedings is more contentious.118 The public is unable discern the 
precise voting breakdown in the saiban-in decision. It is also difficult to examine the dynamics 
of deliberations to determine if the lay judges are influenced by the career judges’ ‘guidance’ 
and if so, to what extent.  
The PRC suffers from the same secrecy restrictions as the saiban-in. Fukurai notes that the 
PRC regime follows the LAS in imposing strict confidentiality requirements on the lay 
participants.119 While one argument may be that this allows the lay participants to make their 
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decisions without fear or favour, it also makes it difficult to peer into the nuances of the PRC’s 
decision making process, including how much influence the prosecutor and legal advisor have 
in the overall regime.  The PRC regime is thus not well known in Japanese communities. 
Ironically, this democratic system that reflects the popular will is hardly popular. Critics have 
noted that it is seldom used.120 In a poll conducted by the Japanese Cabinet, the majority of 
respondents had no knowledge of the PRC system.121 This ignorance extends to jurists as well 
as lay-persons.122 One law Professor at Tokyo University acknowledged this ignorance.123 In 
a more startling illustration, a woman in a Nagasaki Prefecture committed suicide after 
receiving a summons to sit on the PRC, assuming the worse given that the summons had come 
from the prosecutor’s office.124 
C  Business as Usual 
In light of the aforementioned limitations of the LAS and PRC, the status quo has arguably 
remained unchanged and it is business as usual for the players of the criminal justice system. 
If anything, the LAS and PRC may lead to notional public participation and oversight, giving 
ammunition to rebut criticisms. However, the true extent of lay participation, if any, is limited. 
The social management school of thought would argue that these limitations to lay participation 
in the criminal justice system are deliberate institutional barriers enacted by social elites to 
maintain the status quo.125 
While the PRC has seen a few high profile cases, such as the Akashi stampede incident and the 
Fukuchisen Derailment Incident, these are few and far in between and the PRC’s impact on the 
daily work of the prosecutor is minimal. Of the few cases brought, only in 5.5 percent did 
Commissions recommend that prosecutors reconsider or indict, and in only thirty four percent 
of these cases did prosecutors take that advice.126 In other words, the Prosecutorial Review 
Commissions directly affect less than four cases for every 100,000 non-indictments.127 Of 
course, since 2004, the PRC’s recommendations are now binding on the prosecution. However, 
this does not detract from the fact that the PRC is a seldom used mechanism.128  
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The criminal conviction rate has also remains relatively unchanged. In the first year since the 
LAS, there were no acquittals at all.129 At the three year mark, the overall conviction rate still 
remains close to 100%.130 As such, while one of the limitations of the LAS is that prosecutors 
can still bypass the regime with an appeal, the negligible difference in conviction rates pre and 
post LAS means that the prosecutor would rarely have to do so. Indeed, in the first year of the 
LAS, only 1 in 444 saiban-in cases were appealed.131  
A possible concern might have also been that cases would have to slow down as a result of lay 
participation, resulting in an overall less effective criminal process. However, fortunately or 
unfortunately, the LAS does not appear to have resulted in slower or less effective trials. A 
typical jury trial takes on average three to four days to complete and 6 months from indictment 
to judgment.132  This time frame is not significantly longer than a trial before career judges.133 
As such, in so far as the JPL professional is concerned, much has remained unchanged and it 
is business as usual. The players in the criminal justice system can still look forward to a 
predictable outcome and there has been no discernable delay in matters. What has happened is 
that the criminal justice system has gained increased public trust and confidence.  Prosecutors 
have also succeeded in garniering public support by deliberately excluding controversial cases 
from saiban-in trials.134 The judiciary also benefits from an increase in legitimacy.135 PRC 
participants feel sense of confidence in criminal justice system.136 As Jones notes, the LAS 
features have been designed for the incumbent players to retain control, while diminishing 
responsibility.137 The same can be said for the PRC regime. Confidence in the system is 
increased, but nothing much has changed. As such, perhaps the real winners of the system may 
in fact be the judges, legal bureaucrats138 and prosecutors.139 
VI  CONCLUSION 
The PRC and LAS have been heralded as the twin pillars of lay participation, allowing for 
public engagement and oversight at the two most crucial points in the criminal justice system. 
However, as outlined above, it is illogical for a country which makes it so difficult to be 
admitted into the legal profession to then place such trust in the hands of lay participants. 
Indeed, there are strong motivations to maintain the status quo. Both regimes suffer from 
structural limitations, ‘guidance’ and secrecy. Indeed, it may be argued that there has been no 
substantial difference in the outcome of cases since the implementation of the PRC and LAS. 
The criminal justice system is still ‘predictable’, offering a ‘correct’ outcome with efficiency, 
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perhaps an intended effect to the benefit of the incumbent players. The only effect of the token 
lay participation is that it provides ammunition for the incumbents to deflect criticism. As such, 
for all the fanfare and claims of lay participation, it is business as usual in the criminal justice 
system in Japan. 
 
